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535 
INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT  
LAW AND THE EFFECTS OF  
NOVARTIS AG V. UNION OF INDIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, many nations and international organizations have 
made a concentrated effort to homogenize the laws governing intellectual 
property. The attempt at standardization, however, has not been free of 
dissention, particularly with regard to the laws pertaining to 
pharmaceutical patents. This is due to the continuing tension that exists 
between large, multinational pharmaceutical companies (MNCs), and 
developing nations that lack both the infrastructure and capital to establish 
their own self-subsisting pharmaceutical industries.
1
 
For many years prior to its membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), India did not recognize product patents for 
pharmaceuticals.
2
 Without product patents with which to contend, Indian 
pharmaceutical companies were able to churn out countless generic drugs, 
establishing India as one of the leading generic drug manufacturers in the 
world.
3
 The relative affordability of these generic drugs compared to their 
patented counterparts has not only enabled India to provide cheap drugs 
for its own people, but has also made India the de facto pharmacy for 
many developing countries.
4
  
Yet in 2005, because of its obligations under the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), India was 
 
 
 1. Whereas MNCs desire laws that provide for easy patentability of their products, developing 
countriesmany of which are required to look abroad for their pharmaceutical needsbelieve such laws 
would stifle the production of affordable generic drugs and concentrate even greater power in the 
hands of corporations that already dominate the pharmaceutical marketplace. JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, 
PATENT RIGHTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE 
FUTURE 113 (2010). 
 2. Antara Dutta, From Free Entry to Patent Protection: Welfare Implications for the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 160, 162 (2011). 
 3. Janice Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 514–15 (2007).  
 4. Id. Concerning the costs of generic drugs relative to their patented counterparts:  
Companies such as India’s Cipla and Lupin have become the primary source of cheap 
generics of AIDS, cancer and malaria drugs for countries that would never be able to afford 
branded products. But India’s generics industry can sell them at about a tenth of the branded 
cost because they have no development expense to amortize. That is no different than any 
generic drug approach except that India has been libertine in terms of ignoring existing 
patents that are protected elsewhere in the world.  
Eric Palmer, India Set to Rule in Novartis Patent Case, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/india-set-rule-novartis-patent-case/2013-01-04. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
536 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:535 
 
 
 
 
compelled to amend its laws to provide product patent protection to 
pharmaceuticals.
5
 In an attempt to satisfy the competing demands for 
inexpensive drugs and effective intellectual property protection, the Indian 
government created a law that afforded protection to pharmaceuticals only 
if they constituted brand new chemical substances or enhanced the 
therapeutic “efficacy” of known substances.6 This law, which is codified 
under section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005,
7
 has not sat 
well with some MNCs, including the Swiss company Novartis. Following 
the denial of a patent for its leukemia drug, Glivec,
8
 Novartis challenged 
the validity of section 3(d) under TRIPS and the Indian Constitution.
9
 The 
Indian Supreme Court ruled against Novartis in a decision that has, and 
will continue to have, broad implications for MNCs, the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, and people around the world in need of 
affordable drugs.
10
 
This Note gives a brief overview of Indian patent law as it relates to 
pharmaceuticals, considers the challenges the law is currently facing, and 
suggests some possible ways that India may wish to approach those 
challenges. Part II provides a cursory discussion of India’s pharmaceutical 
industry and its place in the world today. Part III traces the history of 
Indian patent law. Part IV focuses on the growing globalization of 
intellectual property law and India’s involvement in the WTO and 
adherence to TRIPS. Part V describes TRIPS Section 3(d) and its 
requirements for patentability, and Part VI gives a procedural history of 
current cases and recent decisions in India involving pharmaceutical 
patents, with an emphasis on the Novartis case. Part VII touches upon the 
TRIPS-compliance issue with section 3(d). Finally, Part VIII presents 
some of the arguments of proponents of affordable health care, who 
consider the Novartis decision a triumph for India and other developing 
countries in desperate need of inexpensive medications. This Note 
 
 
 5. Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIAN 
J.L. & TECH. 15, 16–17 (2005) [hereinafter India’s Tryst with TRIPS]. 
 6. SHAMNAD BASHEER, THE “GLIVEC” PATENT SAGA: A 3-D PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN PATENT 
POLICY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE, available at www.atrip.org/Content/Essays/Shamnad%20Basheer% 
20Glivec%20Patent%20Saga.doc [hereinafter The “Glivec” Patent Saga]. 
 7. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005, §3(d), Gazette of India, section I(2) 
(Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf. 
 8. The drug is patented in the United States as Gleevec. This Note, however, will refer to it as 
Glivec.  
 9. Linda Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 299 (2008). 
 10. Gardiner Harris & Katie Thomas, Low-Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get a Lift in Indian 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/global/top-court-in-
india-rejects-novartis-drug-patent.html?_r=0. 
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concludes that, while the Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in the Novartis 
case may have beneficial implications for the developing world and 
individuals in need of affordable drugs, it ultimately represents a wasted 
opportunity for the Court to clarify section 3(d), which would promote 
foreign investment and spur growth and innovation in the domestic 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries.  
II. INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Since World War II, the international pharmaceutical industry has 
grown significantly.
11
 The need for antibiotics during the war led many 
companies to invest more time and resources into the research and 
development of new drugs.
12
 The years following the war saw a rapid 
expansion of the industry as companies began to establish themselves as 
MNCs by infiltrating foreign markets.
13
 Today, the international 
pharmaceutical industry is dominated by a small number of MNCs.
14
 
These corporations are headquartered in developed nations and carry a 
great deal of financial clout.
15
 
Such corporations, however, are not found in many developing 
countries.
16
 This is primarily due to the high levels of skill, training, 
technology, and capital necessary to produce new or existing drugs.
17
 As a 
 
 
 11. KUANPOTH, supra note 1, at 109. 
 12. Id. at 110. Some companies began the production of specialty drugs, which “led to the 
discovery of several new drugs, then and later, including several effective antibiotics, tranquilizers, 
vitamin B, vaccines, contraceptives, and so on.” Id.  
 13. Id. at 109.  
 14. Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Bayer are examples of large MNCs. The largest MNCs are 
headquartered in developed nations such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland. SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY: PATENT 
PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2005).  
 15. Id. at 3. For instance, in 2003, Pfizer sold $39.6 billion worth of drugs, which accounted for 
8.5% of the global market and exceeded the combined drug sales of all the countries in Asia, excluding 
Japan. Id. at 2. In fact, the sales of each of the top nineteen multinational corporations in 2003 
exceeded those of the entire Indian pharmaceutical market, which at the time amounted to $4.9 billion. 
Id.  
 16. N. Lalitha, Access to Indian Generic Drugs: Emerging Issues, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
PHARMACEUTICALS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 225 
(Kenneth C. Shadlen et al. eds., 2011). 
 17. KUANPOTH, supra note 1, at 111. This is not to say that all developing countries are 
completely void of a pharmaceutical industry or fail to play any significant role in the development 
and production of drugs. Although the refinement of raw materials and research necessary for the 
production of drugs both require a great deal of capital and sophistication, “the formulation and 
packaging of active ingredients and intermediates into finished product forms are relatively simple and 
technically straightforward, and technology and capital investment needed in this process are low.” Id. 
Consequently, many companies send the prepared raw materials to developing nations for completion. 
Id. (citing G. GEREFFI, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPENDENCY IN THE THIRD WORLD 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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result, several developing nations have grown dependent on drug imports 
from other countries such as India.
18
  
Over the years, India has established itself as one of the major 
producers of affordable generic drugs.
19
 The Indian pharmaceutical 
industry today is “considered the world’s third-largest by volume”20 and, 
as of 2010, produces approximately 20% of the world’s generic drugs.21 
Experts anticipate India’s pharmaceutical industry to grow to a value of 
$74 billion by 2020,
22
 solidifying India as “a global leader in the 
pharmaceutical industry.”23 
India is not only a chief exporter of drugs, but also the primary 
producer of drugs for its own population.
24
 India is one of only two 
countries in the world where generic drug manufacturers control a larger 
share of the domestic pharmaceutical market than big MNCs.
25
 A few 
indigenous firms are capable of both generic drug production and research 
 
 
203 (1983)). See generally KUANPOTH, supra note 1, at 112–13 (providing a breakdown of the 
hierarchy of developing nations based on their pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities).  
 18. KUANPOTH, supra note 1. 
 19. Mueller, supra note 3, at 495.  
 20. MV Ramsurya, Pharma, Engineering to Topple IT as Big Paymaster, ECON. TIMES (June 8, 
2010, 6:04 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-06-08/news/28423319_1_salary-
hikes-manufacturing-sector-survey.  
 21. Lalitha, supra note 16. With two-thirds of its domestically manufactured drugs being shipped 
overseas, India now only trails China in exports of pharmaceuticals among developing countries. 
Dwijen Rangnekar, No Pills for Poor People? Understanding the Disembowelment of India’s Patent 
Regime, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 409, 411 (2006). 
 22. Rumman Ahmed & Amol Sharma, Novartis Fights India for Cancer Pill Patent, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 19, 2012, 4:50 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044423310457759497 
3786074692.html. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, India’s pharmaceutical industry 
amounted to $11 billion in 2011. Id. 
 23. Mueller, supra note 3, at 500.  
The success story of its IT sector is admittedly the clearest example of India’s growing stature 
in the knowledge economy, but innovation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors is 
also on the rise. Many Indian-born scientists who have trained in the U.S. are returning to 
India, bringing home their experience in pharmaceutical research and development. The 
country’s ever-expanding pool of scientifically-trained workers is also available to the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. Almost forty percent of India’s university graduates obtain their 
degrees in science and engineering, in contrast with declining enrollments in those fields in 
the U.S. India’s pharmaceutical industry is fast becoming a force to be reckoned with in the 
global marketplace because of its strikingly lower costs of drug research and clinical testing.  
Id. at 500–01 (internal citations omitted).  
 24. Lalitha, supra note 16. “Drugs produced in India satisfy 95 per cent of the domestic 
demand.” Id. (citing Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Surging Globally, Mumbai: EXIM Bank 
Occasional Paper No. 119, 2007).  
 25. Lee, supra note 9, at 296. The only other nation where generic drug manufacturers 
predominate is Japan. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/12
  
 
 
 
 
2014] INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 539 
 
 
 
 
and development, while many smaller companies specialize exclusively in 
reverse-engineering drugs from overseas.
26
  
Yet while the production of drugs is not a problem in India, general 
access to drugs is.
27
 The affordability of pharmaceuticals and lack of a 
comprehensive health insurance system have heavily influenced the 
evolution and development of India’s patent laws and its participation in 
international intellectual property agreements.  
III. HISTORY OF INDIA’S PATENT LAWS 
India passed its first patent law in 1856 during British colonial rule.
28
 
This law was based on the British Patent Law of 1852, which provided 
privileges to inventors for a period of fourteen years.
29
 Following a 
number of modifications, this law later gave way to the Inventions and 
Designs Act of 1888.
30
 Although India was beginning to industrialize at 
this time, its pharmaceutical industry was still in its infancy.
31
  
 
 
 26. Indigenous firms such as Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Cipla Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories Ltd., are a few of the major players in the Indian pharmaceutical industry that are capable 
of both generic drug production and original research and development. Mueller, supra note 3, at 537. 
See also Kuanpoth, supra note 1, at 129 (“Although generics continue to play a major part in their very 
success, several Indian companies have already begun to adjust their business models. Some large 
companies have started to invest substantially in basic research for drug discovery and branded drug 
development, in order to compete in international markets”). Smaller indigenous pharmaceutical firms, 
on the other hand, continue to reverse-engineer drugs that are still protected under foreign patents. 
Mueller, supra note 3, at 537.  
 27. Unlike many developed nations, India lacks a highly developed insurance system that, 
although improving, still forces most Indians to pay for medications out of their own pockets. Mueller, 
supra note 3, at 542–43; Kuanpoth, supra note 1, at 135. Thus, notwithstanding its status as a 
burgeoning leader in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, India continues to face difficulties 
concerning drug pricing and affordability. Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 58. Despite India’s growing 
middle class, which has increased the demand for pharmaceutical products, the vast majority of the 
population “face[s] a health care system that has been described as operating in a state of perpetual 
crisis.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 542–543 (citing Yusuf K. Hamied, Indian Pharma Industry: Decades 
of Struggle and Achievement, at 7 (Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with author)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 28. KALYAN C. KANKANALA ET AL., INDIAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2010).  
 29. Id. at 1–2. 
 30. Mueller, supra note 3, at 506–07. The 1856 Act was first modified in 1859 to grant 
“exclusive privileges . . . to inventors for making, using, and selling their inventions within India for a 
period of fourteen years from the date of filing of the specification.” Kankanala et al., supra note 28, at 
2. 1872 saw the passage of the Patterns and Designs Protection Act, which was subsequently combined 
with the Protection of Inventions Act of 1883 to create the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888. Id.  
 31. During this time, India began to industrialize, excelling in areas such as textile production, 
food processing, and metals. Mueller, supra note 3, at 507 (citing TIRTHANKAR ROY, THE ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF INDIA 1857–1947 158 (2000)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In 1911, the British replaced the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888 
with the Indian Patents and Design Act.
32
 The 1911 Act established India’s 
first system of patent administration and remained in effect until 1972.
33
 
As with the 1856 Act and all subsequent acts, the 1911 Act provided for 
the patentability of pharmaceutical products and therefore enabled foreign 
companies to block the production of their patented drugs in India.
34
 
Domestic drug fabrication remained stagnant up until World War II.
35
  
With its independence from Britain in 1947, India was confronted with 
a number of challenges. As one of the poorest countries in the world, the 
increasingly problematic issue of providing affordable health care for the 
masses was not lost on Indian leaders.
36
 Because affordable health care 
naturally entails affordable pharmaceuticals, Indian officials began an 
extensive review of the 1911 Indian Patents and Design Act shortly after 
independence.
37
 The Government of India appointed two committees to 
spearhead this effort: the Patent Enquire Committee (1948–50) and the 
Patents Revision Committee (1957–59).38 The goal was to “review the 
patent laws in India with a view to ensure that the patent system was more 
conducive to national interests.”39 The reports of the two expert 
 
 
 32. Kankanala et al., supra note 28, at 2. 
 33. Mueller, supra note 3, at 507 (citing P. NARAYANAN, PATENT LAW 4 (3d ed. 1998)).  
 34. Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 128–29. “Under the Act of 1911, the MNCs legally prevented 
the indigenous companies from manufacturing most of the new drugs developed by them during the 
patent term of sixteen years which could be extended by another ten years if the working of the patent 
had not hitherto been sufficiently remunerative to the patentee.” Id. at 129.  
 35. Mueller, supra note 3, at 508 (citing Yusuf K. Hamied, Indian Pharma Industry: Decades of 
Struggle and Achievement, at 2 (Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with author)). There was “virtually no basic 
drug manufacture in the country” at the time. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, the 
pharmaceutical industry was not the only domestic industry that was slow in terms of innovation: “By 
the time of independence in 1947 when India’s population was approximately 400 million persons, 
only 2,610 patent applications (on all types of inventions) were filed annually with the Indian Patent 
Office.” Id. at 508 (citing Ved P. Mithal, Patents in India, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (IN) 62, 64 (1948)).  
 36. Id. at 509. “The unfortunate legacy of British-imposed, foreign-favoring patent laws and a 
largely agrarian economy was a health care system in which most modern medicines were 
manufactured abroad, imported into India and sold there at some of the highest prices in the world.” 
Id. at 509–10. At the time of independence, foreign multinational corporations dominated India’s 
pharmaceutical industry. “Critical drugs such as insulin and penicillin were wholly imported.” Id. at 
510 (citing Planning Commission, Government of India, 1st Five Year Plan, Ch. 32 ¶¶ 96, 99 (Dec. 7, 
1952)).  
 37. Rangnekar, supra note 21, at 410. 
 38. Kuanpoth, supra note 1, at 46. Justice Bakshi Tek Chand led the Patent Enquire Committee, 
while Justice N. Rajagopla Ayyangar led the Patents Revision Committee. Id.  
 39. Mueller, supra note 3, at 511 (quoting Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the 
Revision of the Patents Law (Sept. 1959), at Preface (on file at National Law School of India 
University, Bangalore)(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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committees paved the way for the eventual enactment of the Patents Act of 
1970.
40
  
The India Patents Act of 1970, which repealed the 1911 Act and took 
effect in 1972,
41
 had a significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry.
42
 
Instead of giving recognition to product patents, which was the norm 
among developed nations, the Act reserved protection only for process 
patents.
43
 Under this patent regime, Indian drug manufacturers could copy 
pharmaceutical products that were otherwise patented in foreign nations, 
leading to a boom in the production of generic drugs.
44
 By departing from 
the harsh, “draconian”45 patent laws of the British colonial era, the Indian 
 
 
 40. Kuanpoth, supra note 1, at 46. The second of the two reports (The Ayyangar Report, 1959) 
has been considered the most influential in establishing Indian’s modern patent regime. Mueller, supra 
note 3, at 511–12. The report proffered a three-pronged strategy:  
(i) identification of the types of inventions for which patent protection should be available; 
(ii) determination either to prohibit the granting of Indian patents to foreign entities or to 
require working of such patents in India; and (iii) determination to withstand international 
pressures on India to join international intellectual property conventions such as the Paris 
Convention, which required national treatment.  
Id. (citing Parameswaran Narayanan, Intellectual Property Law 2 (2005)). 
 41. Mueller, supra note 3, at 513. 
 42. See Dutta, supra note 2, at 162; Lee, supra note 9, at 290–91; Rangnekar, supra note 21, at 
410–11. 
 43. Dutta, supra note 2, at 162.  
In a departure from the customary practice in most developed countries, this new legislation 
provided official recognition to process rather than product patents for pharmaceuticals. 
Process patents allowed a small modification in the synthesis of a known chemical entity to 
yield a new patent and enabled several firms to produce essentially the same drug. As a result, 
drugs that were still protected by patent rights in much of the developed world were marketed 
locally by Indian firms at a fraction of the [research and development] cost. While domestic 
firms thrived under the opportunity provided by the 1970 Patent Act, the act’s controversial 
provisions caused the exit of many multinational drug manufacturers from India. 
Consequently, between 1970 and 1993, the market share of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies in India fell from 80% to 39%.  
Id. “By fiscal year (FY) 1978–79, the number of foreign-owned patent applications filed in India had 
decreased to 1,010, less than one quarter of the 4,248 applications filed by non-Indians ten years prior 
in 1968.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 513–14 (citing Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Parthasarathi Banerjee & 
Uttam Kumar Bhattacharya, Indian Patents Act and Its Relation to Technological Development in 
India: A Preliminary Investigation, 19 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 293 (1984)).  
 44. Mueller, supra note 3, at 514. It is also worth noting that even the patents for processes 
usually lasted a relatively short period of time. “[P]rocess patents lasted only for the shorter of five (5) 
years from sealing or seven (7) years from the date of the patent, while the term of all other types of 
patents (e.g., mechanical devices) was fourteen (14) years from the date of the patent.” Id. (citing The 
Patents Act, 1970 § 53(a)-(b), reprinted in P. NARAYANAN, PATENT LAW 543 –97 (Appendix 1) (3d 
ed. 1998)). Mueller, supra note 3, at 526–27. (construing SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-
SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998)).  
 45. Mueller, supra note 3, at 508 (citing Yusuf K. Hamied, Indian Pharma Industry: Decades of 
Struggle and Achievement, at 3 (Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with author)). 
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pharmaceutical industry was able to prosper, fostering the growth of the 
country’s “indigenous scientific and technological capacity.”46  
IV. INDIA AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
The World Trade Organization came into existence on January 1, 1995, 
and along with it came the TRIPS Agreement.
47
 “The TRIPS Agreement 
is, by its coverage, the most comprehensive international instrument on 
intellectual property rights,” instituting high minimum standards on a 
variety of forms of intellectual property.
48
 Industrialized nations pushed 
the agreement as a means of strengthening intellectual property rights 
 
 
 46. Rangnekar, supra note 23, at 410. In addition to the benefits it provided for India’s 
pharmaceutical and healthcare industries, the 1970 Act in many ways demonstrated India’s desire to 
cast off the remaining vestiges of colonialism and “[codify its] dissatisfaction with prevailing 
international principles governing technology transfer.” Id.; Mueller, supra note 3, at 514.  
 47. Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 61. The WTO, which replaced the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was designed to be a permanent fixture in the regulation and enforcement 
of trade between nations. Id. See FLEUR CLAESSENS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 9–37 (2009) for a more in depth discussion of 
previous international trade/intellectual property agreements such as the Berne and Paris Conventions. 
The WTO fulfills its duties by ensuring compliance with TRIPS, the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
(MTAs), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The Uruguay Round, which 
precipitated the establishment of the WTO, “required a ‘single undertaking approach’, implying that 
one [member nation] could not pick and choose agreements to meet national interest and needs, but 
that membership to the WTO entailed accepting all the results of the Round without exception.” Id. at 
39. Consequently, all WTO member nations are obligated to sign onto and follow the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Michael Blakeney, A Critical Analysis of the TRIPS Agreement, in THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE 17, 17 (Meir Perez Pugatch ed., 2006).  
 48. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2000). “The Agreement established 
minimum standards on: copyright and related rights, including computer programs and databases; 
trademarks; geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; integrated circuits; and undisclosed 
information (trade secrets).” Id. TRIPS contains “three broad components”: (1) Parts I and II (Articles 
1–40) establish the goals, objectives, and standards of intellectual property rights; (2) Parts III, IV, and 
V (Articles 41–61) establish the means of enforcement of intellectual property rights; (3) Parts VI and 
VII (Articles 65–73) deals with the needs of developing countries, “such as transitional arrangements, 
technology transfers and technical cooperation, and the institutional arrangements of monitoring and 
review.” Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 62. The primary provisions of TRIPS concerning patents are:  
(i) Patents shall be available ‘for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application; (ii) The term of protection must be a minimum of 20 years from the 
date of filing; (iii) The exclusive rights of the patentees include the right of ‘making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing’; (iv) Limited exceptions to such exclusive rights are 
possible; (v) Compulsory license can be granted subject to certain conditions. A compulsory 
or ‘non-voluntary’ license is an authorization by a government to non-patentees to use the 
subject matter of a patent without or against the consent of the patentee; (vi) In case of 
infringements, the burden of proof will be on the alleged infringer rather than on the right 
holder.  
Id. at 62–63. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/12
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because infringement of those rights was seen as “trade distorting.”49 The 
developing world, however, feared that the more stringent patent laws in 
TRIPS would drive up costs and stifle the generic drug industry.
50
  
Like many developing nations, India was initially opposed to TRIPS.
51
 
Nevertheless, as a member of the WTO, India was required to modify its 
domestic intellectual property laws in order to comply with the 
agreement.
52
 Although India had to implement certain provisions of 
TRIPS immediately, article 65.2 of the agreement granted developing 
nations a transition period for the implementation of other provisions.
53
 
One such provision gave nations without patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products a ten-year period to bring their laws into 
compliance with TRIPS.
54
 Thus, India had until January 1, 2005, to make 
its patent laws relating to pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals 
TRIPS-compliant.
55
 
Indian law went through three stages between 1995 and 2005 in order 
to conform with TRIPS.
56
 First, in 1999, India instituted the “mailbox” 
requirement of article 70.9, which enabled entities to submit product 
patent applications for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals to the 
patent office that would be held until examination in 2005.
57
 Second, India 
introduced the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, which further integrated 
Indian law by extending patent terms to twenty years as stipulated by 
TRIPS.
58
 Third, and lastly, the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 brought 
 
 
 49. Blakeney, supra note 47, at 17. Around the time of the Uruguay Round, the United States 
reported that U.S. traders purportedly suffered approximately $60 billion in annual losses due to 
international intellectual property infringement. Id. Significant losses were found in Europe as well. Id.  
 50. Dutta, supra note 2, at 160. See Correa, supra note 48, at 5–6 for a brief discussion on the 
asymmetries between the northern and southern hemispheres (developed v. developing nations) and 
TRIPS’s impact on that divide.  
 51. See Rangnekar, supra note 21, at 412 (discussing resistance to TRIPS).  
 52. Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 63. 
 53. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Mueller, supra note 3, at 518. 
 54. Mueller, supra note 3, at 518–19. 
 55. Id. TRIPS took effect the same day as the WTO (January 1, 1995). Id.  
 56. Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 65. 
 57. Id.; Mueller, supra note 3, at 519; Rangnekar, supra note 21, at 409. The “mailbox” 
requirement was initially implemented by Presidential decree in 1995, but was not codified until 1999 
when the United States, through the WTO, challenged India’s compliance with TRIPS. Mueller, supra 
note 3, at 519. See Mueller, supra note 3, at 519–26 for more information about the WTO dispute 
between the United States and India over the “mailbox” requirement as well as the Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 1999. 
 58. Mueller, supra note 3, at 526. While the 2002 amendment made a number of changes to 
India’s patent laws, the most significant was the twenty-year extension of patent terms. Id. See 
Mueller, supra note 3, at 526–28 for a more in depth discussion of this amendment.  
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India into compliance with TRIPS by giving full patent protection to 
pharmaceutical products.
59
 It is this final Amendment that has been the 
source of controversy in recent years. 
V. INDIAN PATENT LAW TODAY 
While India made the necessary adjustments to its laws to satisfy the 
requirements of TRIPS, “criticism and concern about the effect of 
pharmaceutical patents on domestic drug prices [compelled] the Indian 
government [to retain] legitimate means for balancing innovation 
incentives against the social costs of pharmaceutical product patents.”60 A 
significant means by which the Indian government can “limit the reach of 
product patent protection” is section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act 
of 2005.
61
  
Section 3(d) essentially provides for a tougher standard for securing 
patents.
62
 Companies that introduce new versions of their pharmaceutical 
products must demonstrate that the new versions are “therapeutically more 
beneficial than earlier versions on which patents had expired.”63 Through 
section 3(d), India is able to prevent “evergreening,” which critics 
characterize as a “common abusive patenting practice”64 where 
pharmaceutical companies attempt to extend patent protection by making 
 
 
 59. Basheer, supra note 5, at 16.  
 60. Dutta, supra note 2, at 162.  
 61. Lee, supra note 9, at 294. Section 3(d) states:  
[T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new 
reactant. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations 
and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless 
they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.  
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d), Gazette of India, section I(2) (Apr. 4, 
2005), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.  
 62. Ahmed & Sharma, supra note 22. 
 63. Id.  
The underlying assumption behind section 3(d) is that derivatives, such as salt forms, 
polymorphs, isomers etc[.] that are structurally similar to known pharmaceutical substances 
are likely to be functionally equivalent as well, and if this is not the case and the new form of 
an existing substance works better than the old form, it is up to the patent applicant to 
demonstrate this and justify the claim to a patent.  
Shamnad Basheer & T. Prashant Reddy, The “Efficacy” of Indian Patent Law: Ironing Out the 
Creases in Section 3(d), 5 SCRIPTED 232, 239 (2008) [hereinafter The “Efficacy” of Indian Patent 
Law].  
 64. Leena Menghaney, India’s Patent Law on Trial, BMJ GROUP BLOGS (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2012/09/27/leena-menghaney-indias-patent-law-on-trial/.  
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minor changes to existing drugs.
65
 Predictably, India’s strict patent regime 
has spawned discontent among large multinational pharmaceutical 
corporations interested in tapping into India’s growing market.66  
VI. THE NOVARTIS CASE 
Recently, some large multinational pharmaceutical corporations have 
taken their frustrations with the Indian patent system to court.
67
 Novartis’s 
struggles with the Indian patent regime began in 1993, when it filed 
patents around the world for its synthesis of the molecule imatinib.
68
 
According to Novartis, however, the molecule can only be administered to 
cancer patients as imatinib mesylate.
69
 The resulting drug is currently 
patented in forty countries as Glivec (Gleevec in the United States).
70
 
 
 
 65. Helen Pidd, Indian Court to Hear Crucial Novartis Patent Case on Cut-Price Generic Drugs, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/21/novartis-
court-battle-glivec-patent. Such “minor changes” include “reformulating [the drugs] or changing the 
delivery system.” Ahmed & Sharma, supra note 25. 
 66. See Taking Pains: Indian Patent Rules Infuriate Big Pharma, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562226 [hereinafter Taking Pains]. 
 67. In addition to the Novartis case, another major dispute that made waves in the pharmaceutical 
world involved the German pharmaceutical giant, Bayer. In March 2012, India’s Controller General of 
Patents issued a compulsory license to Natco Pharma, an Indian drug company, allowing it to 
manufacture a generic version of Bayer’s patented Nexavar. Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India 
Orders Bayer to License a Patented Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/13/business/global/india-overrules-bayer-allowing-generic-drug.html; Menghaney, supra note 
64. Prior to the decision, Bayer sold Nexavar—a drug used in the treatment of liver and kidney 
cancers—in India for 280,000 rupees ($5,600) per month. Bajaj & Pollack, supra. The subsequent 
compulsory license, which reflected the Indian government’s concern with the drug’s cost, enabled 
Natco to produce a generic version of Nexavar at a fraction of the price—8,800 rupees ($176) per 
month, or 3% of Bayer’s price. Id. Natco is still required to pay Bayer a 6% royalty on its net sales, 
and the drug is only available for purchase in India. Id. MNCs were “dismayed” by this decision, 
which Bayer has appealed to India’s Intellectual Property Appellate Board. Ahmed & Sharma, supra 
note 22. Bayer has also sued Cipla Ltd. for patent infringement of Nexavar. Taking Pains, supra note 
66. 
 68. Glivec Patent Case in India: Fact vs. Fiction, NOVARTIS, http://www.novartis.com/ 
downloads/newsroom/glivec-information-center/Fact_vs_fiction_of_Glivec_India_Case.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2012). Because India did not patent pharmaceutical products at the time, Novartis did not file 
there.  
 69. Id.  
The misconception regarding the innovation is based on a patent that was granted in 1993 
(not in India) for the synthesis of the molecule imatinib. This molecule, however, could not 
be administered to patients and represented only the first step in the process to develop 
Glivec as a viable treatment for cancer. We developed the mesylate salt of imatinib and then 
the beta crystal form of imatinib mesylate to make it suitable for patients to take in a pill form 
that would deliver consistent, safe and effective levels of medicine.  
Id. Glivec is now considered safer and easier to use: “[T]he body [absorbs] the medicine 30% more 
easily.” Taking Pains, supra note 66. Shamnad Basheer and T. Prashant Reddy provide a more 
detailed breakdown of the steps involved in the creation of Glivec:  
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Following the formation of the WTO and passage of TRIPS in 1995, 
Novartis filed a patent application for Glivec in India in accordance with 
the “mailbox” requirement.71 In January 2006, when the Glivec patent 
came before the Madras Patent Office, it was rejected on the grounds that 
it was “an unpatentable modification of an existing substance, imatinib.”72 
Pursuant to section 3(d) of the 2005 Act, the Patent Office concluded that 
Glivec failed to show “novelty and inventiveness,” as well as increased 
efficacy as required by the law.
73
 In response, Novartis petitioned the 
 
 
(i) Synthesizing imatinib as its free base, a compound that was patented in the US, EU and 
several other countries. However, this could not be patented in India, owing to the fact that in 
1993, India did not provide product patents for pharmaceutical substances; (ii) Converting the 
free base to a particular salt form, imatinib mesylate, by adding methanesulfonic acid; 
(iii) Crystallising [sic] the imatinib mesylate to obtain the beta crystalline form, which is 
allegedly the most stable polymorphic form of the salt. A patent application was filed for this 
and it is this application that is the subject matter of dispute; (iv) Formulating the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate into a pharmaceutically useful drug, Glivec.  
Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 239. 
 70. Pidd, supra note 65.  
 71. Shamnad Basheer, First Mailbox Opposition (Gleevac) Decided in India, SPICY IP (Mar. 11, 
2006), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2006/03/first-mailbox-opposition-gleevec.html. See Lee, 
supra note 9, at 297–98 for more details about Novartis’s involvement in India prior to 2006. Novartis 
also applied for and was granted an exclusive marketing right (EMR) in 2003, pending grant of the 
patent. Novartis then went on to sue generic drug makers, including Ranbaxy and CIPLA. As Basheer 
and Reddy describe the EMR issue, 
The Madras High Court upheld the EMR and restrained the said drug producers on various 
grounds, including, inter alia, the fact that Novartis ran a free patient access programme [sic] 
titled “GIPAP” (Glivec International Patients Assistance Program) and undertook to make 
this programme [sic] even more user friendly to patients that could afford the drug. This, the 
court held, was sufficient to take care of any “public interest” ground that might have 
militated against the grant of an injunction. The Bombay High Court however disagreed with 
the ruling of the Madras High Court, noting that the validity of the recently issued EMR had 
been seriously challenged by the defendants. Besides, the fact that the drug was more 
expensive and was being imported by the plaintiff (triggering fears of sustained supplies of 
such a critical life-saving drug in India) influenced the court to deny the grant of an 
injunction.  
Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 236–37 (citing Novartis AG v. Mehar Pharma & Anr., 2005 (30) 
P.T.C. 160 (Bom)).  
 72. Taking Pains, supra note 66. It is also worth noting that with the rejection of the patent, “the 
EMR by Novartis died a natural death.” Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 237.  
 73. Basheer, supra note 71, at 2. The Patent Controller held:  
I do not agree with the contention of the Applicant that the 1993 patent discloses only the free 
base. The 1993 patent discloses mathanesulphonic acid as one of the salt forming groups and 
also the 1993 patent specification states that the required acid additions salts are obtained in a 
customary manner. Further, claims 6 to 23 of the 1993 patent claim a pharmaceutically 
acceptable salt of the base compound. The patent term extension certificate for the 1993 
patent issued by the US Patent Office specifically mentions imatinib mesylate (GleevecR) as 
the product. All these points clearly prove that imatinib mesylate is already known from the 
prior art publications. 
Id. The Assistant Controller, also commenting on the “increased efficacy” question, stated:  
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Madras High Court in May 2006, arguing that the Controller General of 
Patents
74
 “erred in rejecting the Gleevec patent application, that Section 
3(d) was not compliant with TRIPS, and that Section 3(d) was vague, 
ambiguous and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India 
because it was discriminatory against Novartis.”75 The Madras High Court 
heard Novartis’s challenges to section 3(d)’s constitutionality and 
compliance with TRIPS, while the Intellectual Property Appellate Board 
(IPAB)
76
 reviewed the Patent Controller’s rejection of the Glivec patent.77 
Both the High Court and the IPAB returned decisions against Novartis.
78
 
 
 
As per the affidavit the technical expert has conducted studies to compare the relative 
bioavailability of the free base with that of beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate and has 
said that the difference in bioavailability may be due to the difference in their solubility in 
water. The present patent specification does not bring out any improvement in the efficacy of 
the beta crystal from over the known substances—rather it states the base can be used equally 
in the treatment of diseases in the preparation of pharmacological agents wherever the beta 
crystal is used. Even the affidavit submitted on behalf of the Applicant does not prove any 
significant enhancement of known efficacy.  
Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 240 (citing Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma and Others, Indian 
Patent Office, Application No. 1602/MAS/1998 (Jan. 25, 2005).  
 74. The Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trademarks, which administers 
the patent laws, is a subordinate office under the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. See 
Lee, supra note 9, at 286–90 for a brief discussion of the basics of the Indian judicial and patent 
administration systems.  
 75. Lee, supra note 9, at 299. Article 14 of India’s Constitution states: “The State shall not deny 
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” 
INDIA CONST. art. 14. With regard to its constitutional claim, Novartis argued that section 3(d) 
“impinges on the fundamental rights of the petitioner” by using such “vague and arbitrary” terms such 
as “‘enhancement of known efficacy’” and “‘differ significantly in prosperities with regard to 
efficacy’” without any clear guidance. Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 241. The Madras High 
Court, however, disagreed with Novartis’s constitutional argument, stating, inter alia, that the standard 
for arbitrariness is quite high, that even “‘skeletal’” legislation is not necessarily arbitrary, and that it is 
ultimately an issue for the legislature. Id. at 241–42.  
 76. The Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) is a special tribunal that was created to 
hear appeals from decisions from the Register of Trademarks and Geographic Indications and the 
Controller of Patents. Lee, supra note 9, at 287–88. The IPAB has jurisdiction over administrative 
patent challenges, including disputes over grants of patents, patent invalidation and upholding, and 
compulsory licensing. Tarun Mathur, Patent Litigation Trend in India (unpublished manuscript, June 
22, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995994. See Kankanala et 
al., supra note 28, at 75–78 for more information on the IPAB and the types of disputes over which it 
has jurisdiction. 
 77. Lee, supra note 9, at 299. 
 78. Shamnad Basheer, Novartis Loses at the High Court: Focus Now Shifts to IPAB, SPICY IP 
(Aug. 6, 2007), http://spicyip.com/2007/08/novartis-loses-at-high-court-focus-now.html [hereinafter 
Novartis Loses at the High Court]; Shamnad Basheer, Breaking News: Indian IP Tribunal Denies 
Patent to Novartis’ Glivec, SPICY IP (Jul. 3, 2009), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2009/07/breaking-
news-novartis-loses-glivec.html [hereinafter Indian IP Tribunal Denies Patent].  
The IPAB held that while the claim covering the beta crystalline (BC) version of IM 
(Imatinib Mesylate) is both novel and inventive, it fails the test under section 3(d), which 
requires a demonstration of “significantly enhanced efficacy” . . . the only kind of efficacy 
that would satisfy section 3(d) is therapeutic efficacy. Novartis’s BC version may possess 
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With regard to the TRIPS compliance question, however, the Madras High 
Court simply concluded that it was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction, and 
that the proper venue for such an issue would be the WTO.
79
 Novartis 
subsequently appealed to the Indian Supreme Court.
80
  
The Indian Supreme Court followed suit, handing down a decision on 
April 1, 2013, in which it echoed the previous court rulings that Novartis 
failed to demonstrate Glivec’s enhanced or superior efficacy in accordance 
with section 3(d).
81
 The Court, however, did not deem it necessary to 
articulate a single, definitive definition of “enhanced (therapeutic) 
efficacy” in order to render a decision.82 The Court also noted that its 
ruling in the Novartis case should not be read as a general prohibition of 
all patents for “incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical 
substances.”83 
VII. IS SECTION 3(d) IN VIOLATION OF TRIPS? 
One of Novartis’s major allegations was that section 3(d) is not in 
compliance with TRIPS.
84
 Some commentators argue that, if this issue 
were to go before the WTO, it is highly unlikely that the organization 
 
 
improved bioavailability, thermodynamic stability, improved flow properties and lower 
hygroscopicity, but this does not amount to an increase in “therapeutic efficacy.”  
Id.  
 79. Basheer, supra note 6, at 8. 
 80. Ahmed & Sharma, supra note 22. Other companies that have had issues with India include 
Gilead Sciences, Inc., which had its patent application for its HIV medication, Viread, rejected by 
India’s patent office, and Roche Holding AG, which has been unsuccessful in getting the Indian courts 
to bring an end to the sale of knockoff versions of its anticancer drug, Tarceva. Id. 
 81. India’s Novartis Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/ 
opinion/the-supreme-court-in-india-clarifies-law-in-novartis-decision.html?_r=0. 
 82. Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, Unreported Judgments 2013, 93–94, available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. In its decision, the Court acknowledged 
the opinions of Anand Grover, who appeared on behalf of one of the “Objectors,” the Cancer Patients 
Aid Association, and Professor Basheer, who appeared purely in academic interest as an intervenor-
cum-amicus. Id. Mr. Grover opined that “efficacy” has an established meaning within the field of 
pharmaceuticals and should be given a narrow definition so as to not include enhanced affinity, 
potency, or bioavailability. Id. at 92–93. Dr. Basheer, on the other hand, took “a less rigid position,” by 
asserting that such factors as a drug’s safety or significantly reduced toxicity should be taken into 
consideration when determining its enhanced therapeutic efficacy under section 3(d). Id. at 93. The 
Court, however, stated that it did “not propose to make any pronouncement on the issues raised by 
[Mr. Grover and Dr. Basheer], as this case [could] be finally and effectively decided without adverting 
to the different points of view noted [in the decision].” Id. at 93–94.  
 83. Id. at 95. 
 84. Basheer, supra note 6.  
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would rule in favor of Novartis.
85
 This opinion is based on article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which gives member states a fair amount of flexibility 
when enacting patent laws that conform to and protect their national 
interests.
86
 The resulting patent laws of the member states, however, 
cannot be “entirely arbitrary.”87 
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states, “[P]atents shall be available 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.”88 Fortunately for WTO member states 
such as India, many of the terms included in TRIPS have been left 
undefined, including “inventive step.”89 By leaving terms like “inventive 
step” open for interpretation, article 27 has allowed India to devise its own 
standards for patentability, as exemplified by the section 3(d) requirement 
that a pharmaceutical product must demonstrate “enhancement of the 
known efficacy” to be patentable.90 The Indian Supreme Court in Novartis 
AG v. Union of India reiterated similar points in its discussion concerning 
the legitimacy of Indian patent laws under TRIPS, despite lacking ultimate 
jurisdiction to rule conclusively in such matters.
91
 
Yet while it appears that India’s patent law may successfully withstand 
Novartis’s TRIPS challenge if it were to reach the WTO,92 there still 
 
 
 85. Id. See also Lee, supra note 9, at 309 (“Assuming that the patent laws of other countries are 
TRIPS-compliant and absent WTO ruling on the contrary, Novartis has likely overstated the 
noncompliance of Section 3(d)”).  
 86. Basheer, supra note 6 (citing Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 114 (2002), http://www.iprcommission.org). 
Specifically, The Doha Declaration, which was adopted by the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in 
2001, reaffirmed the need for flexibility under TRIPS for the sake of developing countries with 
significant public health concerns and insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities. Novartis 
AG, Unreported Judgments 2013, at 35–37. 
 87. Basheer, supra note 6.  
 88. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 53, art. 27. 
 89. Lee, supra note 9, at 309. 
 90. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, supra note 61, § 3(d). Former WIPO director, Nuno 
Pires de Carvalho, when asked about section 3(d)’s compliance with TRIPs, stated,  
WTO members can individually define the term invention for purposes of patentability, 
subject to meeting the TRIPS criteria of “novelty,” “inventive step” and “industrial 
application potential,” of the substance concerned. Therefore, what India did through Section 
3(d) was to make it clear that a number of technical creations are not inventions, unless they 
present a significant increase in efficacy.  
Manisha Singh Nair, Section 3(d) Well Within TRIPS, IPFRONTLINE (Nov. 30, 2007), 
https://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=16824&deptid=6.  
 91. Novartis AG, Unreported Judgments 2013, at 26–37. 
 92. It appears that the Swiss government has little intention in bringing Novartis’s section 3(d) 
challenge before the WTO. Swiss Govt Not to Take Novartis Case to WTO, BUS. STAND. (Aug. 8, 
2007), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/swiss-govt-not-to-take-novartis-case-to-wto/293 
771/. 
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remains some uncertainty. Professor Shamnad Basheer
93
 contends that 
whether section 3(d) actually meets the requirements of TRIPS or falls 
short may depend on the construction of the term “efficacy.”94 He argues 
that if efficacy is given a fairly narrow construction, so as to essentially 
reserve patent protection for new chemical entities only, then section 3(d) 
may in fact violate TRIPS.
95
 The proper construction of “efficacy” 
highlights one of the major concerns with the law, not only as it relates to 
the matter of TRIPS compliance, but also to the more fundamental 
question of what is and is not patentable under Indian law. This is an issue 
that will be given further consideration in the following parts.  
VIII. THE NOVARTIS DECISION AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS 
A significant reason why the Novartis case drew considerable attention 
from the global community was the impact the decision would likely have 
on the availability of generic drugs in the developing world. Many 
proponents of affordable healthcare feared a decision in favor of Novartis 
would be a “death sentence” for patients struggling to pay for treatment.96 
The challenge of providing affordable pharmaceuticals is especially 
pronounced in countries like India, where there is no developed insurance 
system.
97
 
The concern over affordable drugs in India and elsewhere was an 
important factor in the IPAB’s decision to reaffirm the patent office’s 
denial of the Glivec patent application.
98
 Section 3(b) of the Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 2005 holds that “patents cannot be granted to an 
 
 
 93. Professor Shamnad Basheer is Chair Professor of Intellectual Property at National University 
of Juridical Sciences of Kolkata (NUJS). 
 94. Basheer, supra note 6.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Pidd, supra note 65. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Leena Menghaney, a lawyer and 
India manager of the Access Campaign at Medecins Sans Frontieres, summed up the possible 
consequences of a Novartis court victory:  
A win for Novartis would set a dangerous precedent, severely weakening India’s legal norms 
against evergreening and inevitably leading to patents being granted far more widely in the 
country. Filing patent applications covering simple changes in the chemistry or formulation of 
existing pharmaceutical products is a lucrative game for the pharmaceutical business, but also 
a deadly one for patients: it would prevent generic competition for these products and allow 
pharmaceutical companies to continue charging high prices, which can mean the difference 
between life and death.  
Menghaney, supra note 64.  
 97. Mueller, supra note 3, at 542; KUANPOTH, supra note 1, at 135. 
 98. Priyanka Golikeri and KV Ramana, Glivec Patent Ruling a Welcome Turn for Novartis, 
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (July 8, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-glivec-
patent-ruling-a-welcome-turn-for-novartis-1272042.  
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invention, the primary or intended use or commercial exploitation of 
which could be contrary to public order, or morality, or which causes 
serious prejudices to human, animal or plant life or health or to the 
environment.”99 Following this provision, the IPAB concluded that the 
Glivec patent failed not only due to the drug’s lack of enhanced efficacy 
pursuant to section 3(d), but also because its exorbitant price was seen as 
placing the drug “beyond the reach of the common man.”100 
The Supreme Court similarly expressed “bewilderment” over the 
excessive price of Glivec.
101
 Indeed, the justices even complained to 
Novartis about the drug’s cost prior to rendering their decision.102 
Novartis, however, has attempted to stave off these complaints by drawing 
public attention to the fact that 90% of Indian patients diagnosed with the 
form of leukemia that Glivec is designed to combat receive the drug for 
free through Novartis’s donation program.103 But not everyone is 
convinced; as one commentator bemoaned, “health policy cannot be 
hostage to corporate charity.”104   
 
 
 99. Priyanka Golikeri & KV Ramana, Glivec Patent Ruling a Welcome Turn for Novartis, DAILY 
NEWS & ANALYSIS (July 8, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-glivec-patent-
ruling-a-welcome-turn-for-novartis-1272042.  
 100. Id. Interestingly, many commentators, including Professor Basheer, have come out against 
the IPAB’s use of section 3(b) in its denial of Novartis’s Glivec patent. Id. Basheer stated that “the use 
of pricing as a criterion for denying patent would be against the wordings of the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization, which India is 
party to. There is no support for such a ludicrous legal proposition for either Indian or international 
patent law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The idea that a patent can be denied on the grounds 
that it will be expensive, and therefore out of the reach of ordinary people, does seem highly unusual, 
especially from the perspective of someone who is more familiar with American patent law, for 
instance. Such a barrier would certainly prevent the issuance of numerous patents, and considering that 
a driving incentive of securing a patent is for economic reasons, it appears that Section 3(b) flies in the 
face of conventional intellectual property law. Additionally, section 3(b) provides little guidance or 
clarification as to what qualities or, in this case, price, a product/invention must have to be denied a 
patent under Section 3(b). See The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(b), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128092. 
 101. Novartis AG, Unreported Judgments 2013, at 49 n.1. 
 102. Ed Silverman, Indian Court to Novartis: Lower Gleevec Price, PHARMALOT (Sept. 12, 2012, 
12:59 PM) (on file with the WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.). 
 103. Ed Silverman, Novartis, A Gleevec Patent & India: Herrling Explains, PHARMALOT (Aug. 
20, 2012, 8:48 AM), available at NOVARTIS, http://www.novartis.com/downloads/newsroom/product-
related-info-center/pharmalot-novartis-a-gleevec-patent-and-india-herrling-explains.pdf [hereinafter 
Herrling Explains]. 
 104. Hans Löfgren, David and Goliath: Novartis Challenges India’s Patent Law, CONVERSATION 
(Nov. 19, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://theconversation.edu.au/david-and-goliath-novartis-challenges-indias-
patent-law-9880#http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article3373972.ece?homepage=true.  
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IX. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF SECTION 3(d) AND GREATER 
PROTECTION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Although the Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in the Novartis case may 
have beneficial implications for the developing world and individuals in 
need of affordable drugs, there are two notable problems with it. First, 
section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 still requires greater 
clarification. The Indian Supreme Court’s decision leaves enough 
ambiguity regarding the meaning of “enhanced efficacy” that both 
multinational and Indian pharmaceutical companies must continue to 
pursue industry patents without the benefit of a bright-line rule. Second, 
the Court’s narrow interpretation of section 3(d) will likely discourage 
future foreign investment in India and potentially harm India’s own 
growing pharmaceutical industry. 
As touched upon in previous parts, a lingering issue with section 3(d) is 
the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of “enhancement of the known 
efficacy of [a known] substance.”105 Paul Herrling, head of corporate 
research at Novartis and chair of its Institute for Tropical Disease, had 
originally hoped that the Novartis litigation would result in some clarity 
regarding section 3(d)’s language.106 Prior to the Court’s ruling, Herrling 
told Reuters that “[t]he patent for Glivec is not really the issue here . . . [i]t 
is just an example of us wanting very clear legal clarity about what kind of 
innovation is patentable.”107 
Defining “enhanced efficacy” in order to create a bright-line rule, 
however, is easier said than done. Professor Basheer maintains that 
enhanced efficacy can easily be construed to benefit either side of the 
debate.
108
 If enhanced efficacy is given the narrow, “therapeutic 
efficacy”109 definition, as it was by both the Madras High Court and the 
 
 
 105. Lee, supra note 9, at 310–11. 
 106. Silverman, supra note 102. 
 107. Novartis Argues for Glivec Patent at India’s Top Court, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-india-novartis-glivec-idUSBRE88A0BN20120911. 
Herrling’s claim that “[t]he patent for Glivec is not really the issue here,” is supported by the fact that 
a loss for Novartis would be but a hiccup for the company financially. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
A loss for Novartis in the case would not have a big financial impact since India is never 
likely to account for more than a small fraction of Glivec’s global sales, which totaled $ 4.7 
billion last year. [Again,] [t]he real concern for the industry is that a rebuff would confirm 
India as a country where patents are exceptionally hard to secure. 
Id.  
 108. Basheer, supra note 6. 
 109. “[I]n the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be 
‘therapeutic efficacy.’ The question then arises, what would be the parameter of therapeutic efficacy 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/12
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Supreme Court in the Novartis matter, then few derivate drugs (i.e., 
existing drugs or chemical compounds that have been modified in some 
way) will make the cut for patentability under section 3(d).
110
 Under this 
construction of the term, Glivec was denied a patent because, while the 
beta crystal form of imatinib mesylate is safer and easier to use, it is not 
any more effective for the actual treatment of cancer.
111
 Thus, 
pharmaceutical corporations such as Novartis tend to be in favor of a 
lower standard and broader definition of enhanced efficacy so as to 
 
 
and what are the advantages and benefits that may be taken into account for determining the 
enhancement of therapeutic efficacy? With regard to the genesis of section 3(d), and more particularly 
the circumstances in which section 3(d) was amended to make it even more constrictive than before, 
we have no doubt that the ‘therapeutic efficacy’ of a medicine must be judged strictly and narrowly.” 
Novartis AG, Unreported Judgments 2013 at 90–91. 
 110. Basheer, supra note 6. The Madras High Court relied on the Darland’s Medical Dictionary 
for its definition of the term, “efficacy.” Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, (2007) 4 MLJ 
1153, 1290. The Court held:  
The position therefore is, if the discovery of a new form of a known substance must be treated 
as an invention, then the Patent applicant should show that the substance so discovered has a 
better therapeutic effect. Darland's Medical Dictionary defines the expression “efficacy” in 
the field of Pharmacology as “the ability of a drug to produce the desired therapeutic effect” 
and “efficacy” is independent of potency of the drug. Dictionary meaning of “Therapeutic”, is 
healing of disease - having a good effect on the body.” Going by the meaning for the word 
“efficacy” and “therapeutic” extracted above, what the patent applicant is expected to show 
is, how effective the new discovery made would be in healing a disease/having a good effect 
on the body? In other words, the patent applicant is definitely aware as to what is the 
“therapeutic effect” of the drug for which he had already got a patent and what is the 
difference between the therapeutic effect of the patented drug and the drug in respect of 
which patent is asked for. Therefore it is a simple exercise of, though preceded by research, 
—we state—for any Patent applicant to place on record what is the therapeutic effect/efficacy 
of a known substance and what is the enhancement in that known efficacy.  
Id. This is the definition of “efficacy” that proponents of affordable pharmaceuticals support as a 
means of preventing evergreening.  
Consumer groups wish to peg the “efficacy” standard as high as possible in order to ensure 
that there are very few pharmaceutical patent grants. Illustratively, in their pre-grant 
opposition filed against the application at the patent office, the CPAA [(Cancer Patients Aid 
Association)] recommended that “efficacy” be interpreted in a drug regulatory manner. More 
interestingly, in a submission made to the Mashelkar Committee, the Affordable Medicines 
Treatment Campaign (AMTC) supported the introduction of a clause that would have 
restricted patentability to only new chemical entities (NCE’s)—in other words, it advocated a 
total ban on any kind of incremental pharmaceutical patenting.  
Basheer, supra note 6 (citing Dr. R. A. Mashelkar et al., Report of the Technical Expert Group on 
Patent Issues (Dec. 2006), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/mashelkar_ommittee_report. 
doc).  
 111. Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India’s Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Patents, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/global/indias-supreme-
court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Glivec Patent 
Case in India: Fact vs. Fiction, supra note 68.  
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include modifications relating to an existing drug’s safety and ease of 
use.
112
 
Though it may appear that the Indian courts did in fact provide a 
clearer meaning to section 3(d) by following a strict and narrow 
interpretation of “enhanced efficacy,” the Supreme Court ultimately left 
the issue open. The Court entertained the opinions of proponents on both 
sides of the narrow/broad-definition debate,
113
 but concluded it was 
unnecessary for it to articulate a definitive standard for enhanced efficacy 
that could be applied in future patent disputes.
114
 Rather, the narrow 
approach the Court took in the Novartis case was purely for the purpose of 
judging the patentability of Glivec under the Patents (Amendment) Act of 
2005.
115
 Future claims that an incremental innovation, such as a new 
drug’s comparative increase in bioavailability116 or reduction in toxicity, 
constitutes an enhancement of therapeutic efficacy will be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.
117
  
This remaining uncertainty as to what may in fact be patentable under 
the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, as well as the limited precedent set 
by the Court’s Novartis decision requiring drugs to meet a certain degree 
of enhanced efficacy, will, at least for the near future, discourage foreign 
investment in India. While the Supreme Court requested that its decision 
not be read as a prohibition on patents for all incremental innovation,
118
 
the reality is that many MNCs will question their ability to secure patents 
for their products in India. Foreign firms will simply abstain from 
 
 
 112. Bajaj & Pollack, supra note 111; Basheer, supra note 6. “On the other hand, multinational 
pharmaceuticals wish to peg the ‘efficacy’ standard as low as possible. In fact, Novartis would prefer 
that section 3(d) not exist at all. Which is essentially why it challenged section 3(d) as violating 
TRIPS, and the constitution of India.” Id. Interestingly, Professor Basheer suggests that India could 
actually look to the United States for guidance on patent laws as they relate to pharmaceutical 
derivatives. Id. In the United States,  
[T]he patentability of a pharmaceutical derivative such as a new salt form or polymorph 
hinges to some extent on whether or not such derivative demonstrates ‘unexpected or 
surprising results.’ Under this standard, ‘unexpected results’ would include not just 
‘therapeutic’ efficacy, but any other significant advantage as well, such as enhanced 
bioavailability, heat stability, humidity resistance, etc.  
Id. (citing Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). See id. for a more in-depth comparison 
of section 3(d) to United States pharmaceutical patent law.  
 113. See supra note 82. 
 114. Novartis AG, Unreported Judgments 2013, at 93–95. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Bioavailability is “the degree and rate at which a substance (as a drug) is absorbed into a 
living system or is made available at the site of physiological activity.” Bioavailability, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bioavailability (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Unreported Judgments 2013, at 95.  
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investing in India, perhaps by withholding the introduction of new 
products to the Indian market, or by refusing to create new high-paying 
jobs there.
119
 This possibility is troubling in the face of India’s increasing 
need to attract foreign investment in order to bolster its weak currency, 
and to meet the demands of its growing middle class.
120
  
Additionally, the Novartis decision is detrimental to innovation and 
will likely harm India’s own growing pharmaceutical industry. Chip 
Davis, the executive vice president of advocacy at the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America, characterized the innovation 
environment in India as “deteriorating,” and said that the recent Novartis 
decision highlights his group’s belief that the Indian government and 
courts do not “recognize the value of innovation and the value of strong 
intellectual property . . . .”121 By failing to promote broader protection for 
pharmaceutical patents, India runs the risk of dampening the kind of 
innovation that leads to the creation of new medicines.
122
 
Under the prevailing interpretation of section 3(d), it is very difficult to 
acquire a patent for a drug with incremental improvements because it will 
likely fail to meet the “enhanced therapeutic efficacy” threshold.123 
Although many affordable drug advocates view this interpretation as an 
effective means of ensuring affordable drugs and preventing the practice 
of evergreening by large MNCs,
124
 it ultimately harms domestic drug 
 
 
 119. Harris & Thomas, supra note 10; Ahmed & Sharma, supra note 22. “Novartis says India is 
discouraging innovation by weakening patents—reducing the incentive for big companies to invest 
time and money to discover new drugs.” Id. Before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Novartis v. Union of 
India, Ranjit Shahni, Novartis India’s managing director, stated that clarity of the Indian law is 
necessary for future investment in India by large firms: “We are seeking clarity on the application of 
patent law in India . . . [k]nowing we can rely on patents in India benefits government, industry and 
patients because research-based organizations will know if investing in the development of better 
medications for India is a viable long-term option.” Id. Following the Court’s decision, Novartis 
decided that it would only release new drugs in India after it had secured a patent on those drugs, and 
would also refrain from conducting research and development activities there for the time being. 
Kaustubh Kulkarni & Suchitra Mohanty, Novartis Loses Landmark India Cancer Drug Patent Case, 
REUTERS, Apr. 1, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/01/us-india-novartis-
patent-idUSBRE93002I20130401. 
 120. Ahmed & Sharma, supra note 22. 
 121. Chip Davis quoted in Harris & Thomas, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. Kulkarni & Mohanty, supra note 119. 
 123. Basheer & Reddy, The “Efficacy” of Indian Patent Law, supra note 63, at 244.  
 124. It may seem difficult to counter the arguments made by affordable healthcare advocates, but 
there are reasons for why their views may actually be shortsighted. Professor Basheer contends, 
Of course, were one to see intellectual property policy through a long-term dynamic 
innovation lens, one will appreciate that even consumers will benefit from more innovation—
if there is no drug, there is no question of access to the drug. Unfortunately, most public 
health groups and civil society activists resort to a myopic “pricing” lens i.e. beat the price 
down to the lowest possible level, without regard for anything else. 
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companies that have just recently begun to invest in their own research 
and development.
125
 Because India’s major domestic pharmaceutical 
companies have yet to accrue the infrastructure and capital to make major 
leaps in drug innovation, a number of them have focused on “incremental 
innovation.”126 One Indian parliamentarian suggested that patents should 
be made available for incremental innovations because “Indian scientists 
do not have the know-how or capital to come up with new chemical 
entities, but do have the know-how to make improvements.”127 As is the 
general argument in favor of the protection of intellectual property, the 
failure to ensure patent coverage for even these incremental inventions is 
bound to stifle innovation, which is an unfortunate prospect in a country 
that is quickly emerging as a global player in the realm of science and 
technology, and will likely be in such a position for years to come.
128
  
 
 
Basheer, supra note 6. Additionally, there are arguably more significant factors that impede or limit 
accessibility to drugs, such as poor diagnosis, infrastructure, and distribution. Ahmed & Sharma, supra 
note 22. For instance, India’s lack of a comprehensive insurance system may be a greater barrier to 
affordable drugs than a bolstering of patent protection for pharmaceutical products. According to 
Malvinder Mohan Singh, chairman of Fortis Healthcare, a New Delhi-based medical company, less 
than 20% of Indians are covered by healthcare insurance policies (compared to China, where 95% of 
the population is covered by some form of health insurance). Bruce Einhorn, India Needs Doctors, 
Nurses, and Health Insurance, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2012), http://www.business 
week.com/articles/2012-05-30/india-needs-doctors-nurses-and-health-insurance. Unfortunately, “[g]iven 
the many other challenges India’s poor face, expanding health insurance coverage isn’t going to top 
the agenda for the country’s politicians . . . [w]hile there might be some talk among policy makers 
about enacting some changes, anything dramatic is years away.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). India also faces a shortage of doctors, as it only has six doctors per 10,000 (compared to the 
United States, which has 27 doctors per 10,000 people). Id.  
 125. While some of the large pharmaceutical companies in India export many of their drugs to 
developed markets such as the United States, “there is a great untapped rural market for medicines in 
India, [and thus] it is possible that the Indian market will grow exponentially in the coming years.” 
Basheer & Reddy, supra note 63, at 264.  
 126. Basheer, supra note 6. Such incremental innovations include new heat stable forms, drug 
delivery systems, and extended release capsules. Id. Basheer additionally notes for illustrative 
purposes that “under a restrictive efficacy standard, Ranbaxy’s [major domestic pharmaceutical 
company] incremental innovation which enabled Bayer’s famed anti-anthrax drug, Cipro to be taken 
just once a day, will not gain patent protection.” Id. (citing Padmashree Gehl Sampath, Economic 
Aspects of Access to Medicines After 2005: Product Patent Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies 
in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES, available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/PadmashreeSampath 
Final.pdf). 
 127. Mr. Kharabela Swain, a member of the Indian Parliament, made this comment during the 
debate over the 2005 Amendment. Basheer, supra note 5, at 34 n.60 (citing Lok Sabha Debate, Mar. 
22, 2005, available at http://164.100.24.230/Webdata/datalshom001/dailydeb/22032005.htm).  
 128. “If the nonobviousness standard is set so high that it effectively bars patentability of most 
incremental pharmaceutical innovations, that rule may contravene TRIPS and be detrimental to the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry by failing to provide proper incentives for research and development 
for the long term.” Lee, supra note 9, at 312. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
The concern for securing access to affordable drugs is a real one, and 
there are strong moral arguments for why increasing patent protection for 
the products of powerful MNCs works only to hurt the common man. The 
reality, however, is that the protection of intellectual property rights 
provides these corporations with the needed incentive to invent and 
manufacture the drugs on which patients around the world rely, whether 
branded or generic. In theory, India could continue down its current path 
where its generics industry simply reverse-engineers the pharmaceuticals 
that are researched and developed elsewhere. But if India desires to grow 
into its role as a major scientific and technological powerhouse, then it 
must work to protect intellectual property rights, as opposed to doing the 
bare minimum to ensure compliance with TRIPS. It is no mystery why 
Indian pharmaceutical patent law has developed the way it has, but India 
has also changed significantly since it enacted its first patent laws. 
The Novartis case was, in many ways, a missed opportunity for India to 
redefine its place in the international debate over intellectual property 
rights. The decision may serve the immediate interests of India’s generics 
industry and supporters of inexpensive pharmaceuticals, but may 
ultimately hinder the growth of research and development, both at home 
and abroad. 
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